e££ect political change. ~hereas deconstruction avoids taking a
"yes or no" position in a conscious attempt to avoid being
coopted by the aystem o£ phallocentric logic that it critiques,
the woman's movement lIIust articulate clear "yes or no" positions.
~hile it is necessary £or £elllinists to take these positions, we
can acknowledge that none o£ thelll is £ully true or correct. ~e
can perhaps best see thelll as working positions, necessary but
incomplete. The questions at their base are o£ten binary and
neither answer is satis£actory.
But here the deconstructive paradiga applies as Rabine
suggests. For as deconstructionists know all too well, every
challenge to logocentrism is incomplete, because it exists, can
only exist, in the language o£ logocentrism. And this is the
£eminist dileallla or challenge too. How to act within a
~etaphysical logic o£ patriarchy in order to dis antle it. The
trick according to Kristeva is to avoid identi£ying with the
patriarchal power structure that we think we are deJllysti£ying and
£ighting. Or as Jane Gallop has cautioned: we aust try to resist
the desire to encolllpass di££erence, to "get it all together," to
erase women in an atteapt to de£ine, represent or theorize woman
( " An n i e Leclerc ~riting a Letter with Verllleer," in The Poetics o:f
Gender, ed. Nancy K. Miller, 1987).
Probably the most di££icult aspect o£ the task be£ore us is
that it requires 1II0ving :fro. the well-known terrain o:f binary
logic to the less-com£ortable realm o£ the unknown.
Or as
Kristeva has said, we're ~oving :from a patriarchal society to
"who knows what?" Medieval £eJlinists, especially readers o£ the
adventure story, should £eel right at hoae with this journey into
the unknown, into the iaprevisible o£ what is still to come.
Except that in this instance the subject o£ the adventure will
not be the knight, but the £eJlinist critic launching out on her
own aventure.
II. Desire in Language: Theory, Feminism, and Medieval Texts
Geraldine Heng, English Dept., Cornell Univ.
Let lIIe begin by telling two storiea which will help to £ocus
Illy particular interest in our session today.
In December o£ '86, I gave a paper at the MLA in New York,
in a special session on £elllinism and edieval literature.
One o£
my strategies at the tiae involved reading a £eJlinine presence in
masculine-centred romance by wil£ully scrutinizing everything the
text did not say, while ignoring everything the text did in £act
highlight, and locating Illy reading in what the marxist Pierre
Macherey calls "the unconscious o£ the work", and what postLacanians re£er to simply as "the textual unconscious." A£ter
the session, a very nice wo.an came up to .e, and in the course
o£ conversation asked a question that was obviously lIIuch on her
mind, and which therea£ter shadowed my own £or many .onths.
"~hen you read," she asked quietly, "how can you know you are
really reading the unconscious o£ a text?" I answered at length,
but was unsble to satis£y either o£ us. Sixteen months later, I
can atill see her in ay .ind walking away, dissppointed at not
having come to any certainty as to where the dividing line was
between the conscious and the unconscious text, and between the

text and its reader.
Her desire £or certainty, and clear
knowledge-- £or a rule that might be applied and £ollowed through
in all instances-- haunted me, perhaps because it spoke,
uncannily, £or me as well; and i t became increasingly vital to
negotiate the pit£alls o£ the question.
The second example arises £ro~ the occasion o£ our session
itsel£.
When Beth £irst wrote with an invitation to sit on this
panel, she voiced her concern-- an honest and important concern-that the session should "bring aedieval scholars
together ••• rather than set thea against one another."
In a
recent letter, she mentioned once more how disturbed she £elt at
the "division alllong £eminist scholars", and repeated her desire
that we try to "reconcile our di££erent points o£ view .•• in order
to put together an outline o£ £elllinist theory that would be most
use£ ul to the appreciation o£ medieval and renaissance works."
"At the very least," she said hope£ully, "I would like us to be
able to articulate how a £eminist approach to such early works
di££ers £ro~ £eminist approaches to later works." Expressed like
this, I recognised a similar dri£t in some o£ my own hopes, snd
positions with which I at least partly identi£ied, in h o we v e r
tentative or contingent a £ashion.
Three things would there£ore
seea to be desired by us, organised somewhat like this:
one, an
end to our division and contentiousness as £eminists; two, a body
o£ £eminist theory speci£ically applicable to early literatures;
and three, a di££erentiation between how we read earlier and
later £orms o£ literature.
My subject today, as you might guess £rom these exa~ples, is
desire-- in particular, what is at stake when we voice or do not
voice our desire.
As £eminists we are £aailiar with the ways in
which traditional critical reception masters a text and produces
a tradition which excludes or marginalizes us-- through the
pretence, say, that texts per~it only a narrow range o£ possible
readings, which are then by de£inition the only legitimate ways
in which they may be read.
By eliding over its own desire, a
non-£eminist reading is able to masquerade as politically
neutral-- that is to say, un~otivated by any hierarchy o£ values,
implicit ideological commitlllents, or assumptions about power.
To
outwit this particular attempt at mastery-- this manipulation o£
the text which hides what is at stake in the act o£ manipulation- £eminists o£ten make explicit the politics o£ their own
reading, even as they proceed to identi£y the politics o£ the
texts and critics they read.
A common £eminist position is that
all readings are political, whether they claim to be so or not,
whether or not they are conscious o£ the politics they
demonstrate.
Invoked in this premise that I have coded as £e~inist is
thus already a certain admission:
namely, that both the text and
the reader participate in the determination o£ meaning.
That is
to say, texts do not coerce and £orce only particular readings
upon a reader; neither are they endlessy re-readable.
Readers in
turn cannot pretend to a transcend ant position o£ objectivity in
con£ronting a text, but must accept responsibility £or the
choices they make in the course o£ reading.
There are
resistances and sedimentations within a reader; each meets the
desire o£ the other in a process that can only be described as
endlessly dialogical-- or, in the vocabulary o£ psychoanalysis,
trans£erential.

In this drama of reading, then, no certainty is possible for
where is the line to be fir~ly drawn between what is in a text,
and what is in the reader? Each is ~utually implicated in the
other; and the extent and character of that mutual implication
shifts fro~ .o~ent to moment within every reading compact.
Nor,
as one comes to realize, is ~astery finally possible: for there
is that within a text, and within a reader, which is blind to
itself.
Along with what a text intends to say, comes that which
it did not intend, and of which it is not even aware; similarly,
the discourse of every reader is equally traversed by its own
blindnesses.
The attraction of poststructuralist and psychoanalytic forms
of feminist theory for me lies in part in this frank admission of
the utter iapossibility of mastery and certainty, an ad~ission
which turns back the iapetus of our desire for both.
Such kinds
of feminisa do not seek to replace, wholesale, male mastery with
fe~ale mastery of the text and the critical tradition, but to
question the boundaries by which inclusions and exclusions are
stabilized, and the disse~inations of power necessarily
entrenched with each and every laying-down of a boundary.
The
Willingness of such feainist readings to admit that they can
themselves ever only be partial and provisional in nature, in the
end re-doubles, for ~e, their political force.
But it is always easier to detect and explore the desire of
the other, in all its political ramifications, than to examine
the implications of our own.
What is ~eant, for instance, by our
desire to evolve a homogenous body of feminist theory directed to
addressing medieval or renaissance texts? And what is at stake
when we atteapt to draw a line between groups of texts,
designating one kind as different, in essence, from another, and
ask for separate considerations in reading each kind? Might we
not suspect, firstly, in our wish to develop a body of theory for
application to medieval literature, a desire that the theory
should master the literature? That is to say, we would group
ourselves alongside the position of a superior, theoretical
knowledge- manipulating that knowledge to explain, clarify,
illuminate, infor~ and re-arrange subordinate textual knowledges.
Conversely, in our de~and that theory be appropriate to medieval
literature may be sensed a current in the opposite direction:
the desire to sub~it theory to the authority and jurisdiction of
the medieval text, which would then determine and direct its
usages.
Thus subject to inspection and correction by medieval
literature, an appropriate fora of theory would easily become
appropriable, and finally, be appropriated by the very literature
with which it is supposed to enter into discourse, its potential
for speaking in a different voice smothered and subsumed at the
outset.
Finally, in our request for a clear separation between
fe~inist approaches to earlier texts, and feminist approaches to
later ones, may similarly be discerned the politics of an
interested desire-- our desire to privilege and protect our own
specialism by constructing a barrier to keep us in, and keep
others out, and thus secure the fleeting illusion of a fictive
mastery over literary property.
It stands to reason then-- not, perhapa, the reason of
common sense, but the reason of an un-common sense-- that we
cannot afford to rule out any kind of feminist readings, on any
texts, of any period, as inappropriate or illegitimate.
To

exclude some kinds o£ £eminism is to risk your own subjection to
the exclusionary principle by others, including anti-£eminists:
and to endanger the multiplicity and heterogeneity that £eminism- written in the plural-- o££ers.
This is not, o£ course, to
deny or minimize the presence o£ genuine con£lict and struggle
within £eminist-in£lected theory- - £or £e~inis~ is, i£ anything,
a theory o£ struggle-- or to endorse contradiction over
conciliation.
It does, however, ask that each £eminist reading
be considered in its own terms, against a background o£ its own
logic and assumptions: and that we speak across our di££erences
while mutually respecting di££erence itsel£.
For it is in the
very proli£eration o£ multiplicity, heterogeneity and di££erence
that our de£ense against our own tendency toward mastery or
hegemony lies:
in our _d i Vi s i o n , perhaps, in our strength.
III.
Feminism and Medieval Studies
Wendy Clein, The University o£ Connecticut, Hart£ord
Fe~inism has helped us to understand that no approach to a
text is £ree o£ theory or ideology.
This insight is particularly
relevant to scholars o£ the ~edieval period.
More than students
o£ other periods we have appealed to history as an escape £rom
ideological contamination.
But as a cultural construct, history
cannot avoid being enmeshed in the moment o£ its makers and its
making.
May we then abandon history and claim the Wi£e o£ Bath
as a £ourteenth century £eminist or the £emale myatic as the
narcissistic wo~an? I think we should be more cautious.
Feminists must resist reaaking the Middle Ages in our image, for
the masculine tendencies to appropriate and specularize have
already yielded £alsely onolithic versions o£ the past.
At the
same time, the Middle Ages needs to be revisioned by feminists.
Patriarchal culture, still viewed by some as the Western
tradition, cannot be allowed to account £or all o£ culture.
Women's texts and the feminine sub texts to be found in much
medieval writing challenge the cultural hegemony o£ great men and
great books.
How can £eminists best approach the Middle Ages? Feminist
theories o££er a wide range o£ critical practices.
One o£ the
bene£its o£ the explosive growth o£ theoretical £eminist
discourae in the eighties is that it enables us to speak with an
intellectual sel£-consciousness that was not available to the
pioneers in our disciplines.
But one danger o£ theoretical
debate is that it becomes a struggle £or power.
I think
feminists need to resist replicating the "Oedipal" struggles £or
power that characterize patriarchy.
When we promote a particular
theory, we need to guard against the tendency to silence the
opposition.
That is what appears to be happening in the debate
between "Anglo-American" and "Continental" practice.
In response
to the criticism o£ American "gynocritics" as essentialist or
empiricist, we hear the charge that £eminists who adopt the
insights of Marx, Derrida, or Lacan build on £oundations that are
"irretrievably Misogynist" (Bay~ 45).
Why must we search £or some totaliZing and single theory o£
feminism?
For £eminists studying the Middle Ages, I would
propose instead a critical practice in which no method is
irretrievable and none has the £inal say.
It does not disturb me

